Data analysis for the COVID-19 early dynamics in Northern Italy by Gaeta, Giuseppe
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
02
06
2v
2 
 [q
-b
io.
PE
]  
5 M
ar 
20
20
Data analysis for the COVID-19 early dynamics
in Northern Italy
G. Gaeta
Dipartimento di Matematica, Universita’ degli Studi di Milano
via Saldini 50, I-20133 Milano (Italy)
and
SMRI, 00058 Santa Marinella (Italy)
giuseppe.gaeta@unimi.it
5/3/2020
The COVID-19 epidemics, started in China in January 20201, was recognized
to have reached Italy around February 20; recent estimates show that most
probably the virus circulated in the country already in January, but was not
recognized.
The development of the epidemic in Italy was characterized by a rather
large number of new cases even in early days. This led to the isolation of two
relatively small areas – one with about 50,000 inhabitants and the other with
bout 3,000 ones – and in these areas the search for infected cases has been
performed by a wide number of laboratory exams, which led to the discovery of
a rather large number of cases with weak or no symptoms at all. In fact,about
50% of identified contagion cases are being teated by simple home isolation.
This should be compared with early data from China and in particular in
Wuhan (where the huge number of both serious medical cases and the total
population presumably prevented from screening contacts of infected people not
showing symptoms, except maybe for medical doctors most involved in fighting
the virus), which reported a very small number, of the order of a few percent,
of asymptomatic contagion [3].
On the other hand, the Chinese report made a well defined difference between
serious and less seriously affected patients, showing that the first case amounted
to about 20% of the total COVID-19 patients, all of whom were hospitalized.
In this note we want to discuss raw data for the Italian situation; in a com-
panion paper we will put forward a very simple model (of the SIR type [7]) tak-
ing into account the presence of a large number of asymptomatic cases, many
of which are most probably not detected nor detectable except in very small
1Data analysis from various sources, see e.g. [4], suggest first cases may have developed
earlier on, albeit not recognized as due to a new virus.
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communities2; this will then be used to understand how much a prompt identi-
fication of similar cases (not practically feasible at this stage, but which could
become possible if rapid and economic tests would be commercially developed)
could help in reducing the spread of the infection.
The used data were obtained from the publicly available ones provided by
the daily Italian “Protezione Civile” reports [1] ; the total number of cases in
the country are also reported by W.H.O. [2]. General facts about the COVID-19
epidemics in China can be accessed though the China CDC early report [3] and
through the WHO-CDC document [5]; statistical and philogenetic analyses are
made publicby the Imperial College group [4].
1 Raw data
1.1 Benchmark: China
We start by recalling some facts and figures about the situation in China.
The spreading of COVID-19 in all of China (thus not making a distinction
between the Hubei region and the rest of the country) is summarized in the
semi-logarithmic plot of Figure 1. This shows that the growth rate α for the
number of total cases in day k,
n(k) = exp[αk] n(0) (1)
passed from αi = 0.330 for the early period (in particular, this fit was obtained
for the period January 23 – February 2) to αf = 0.006 for the last available data
(in particular, this fit was obtained for for the period February 21 – March 2),
showing that the drastic measures taken by the Chinese government produced
a substantial effect.
The doubling time τ , obtained from the above via
τ = α−1 log(2) , (2)
passed correspondingly from τi = 2.1 to τf = 122.
The daily growth factor γ is determined as
γ = exp[α] ; (3)
this passed from γi = 1.391 to γf = 1.006.
2We understand that in the smaller of the isolated communities in Northern Italy, totalizing
about 3,000 inhabitants, a mass screening is being conducted; this should provide more reliable
data on the fraction of asymptomatic infections, together with other precious information.
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Figure 1: Epidemiological data for all of China,as provided by WHO [2]. Cu-
mulative cases in China; these are fitted by exponential laws (1) corresponding
to best fits for days 3-13 and for days 32-42.
day cases day cases day cases day cases day cases
1 282 2 309 3 571 4 830 5 1297
6 1985 7 2761 8 4537 9 5997 10 7736
11 9720 12 11821 13 14411 14 17238 15 20471
16 24363 17 28060 18 31211 19 34598 20 37251
21 40235 22 42708 23 44730 24 46550 25 48548
26 50054 27 51174 28 70635 29 72528 30 74280
31 74675 32 75569 33 76392 34 77042 35 77262
36 77780 37 78191 38 78630 39 78961 40 79394
41 79968 42 80174
Table I. COVID-19 cases in China; day 1 is January 21. Source: WHO
situation reports [2]. Note that on Day 28 (February 17) the method of
counting was changed (clinical evidence being considered sufficient even
without laboratory test), leading to a sudden jump in the number of cases.
1.2 Benchmark: Korea
The Republic of Korea (also known as South Korea; population around 52,000,000)
is another country severely struck by COVID-19; this is also a relevant bench-
mark for the Italian situation given the similar population in the two countries
and the similar political system (parliamentary democracy). In this case there
was a sudden increase in the number of cases starting from February 19. In
this case the restrictive measures also led to some reduction in the propagation
speed of the epidemics, albeit of a smaller amount than in China.
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Figure 2: Epidemiological data for the Republic of Korea, as provided by WHO
[2]. These are fitted by exponential laws (1) corresponding to best fits for days
4-10 and for days 10-17.
In this case the “initial” fit refers to days from February 18 to February 24,
while the “final” one to days from February 24 to March 2.
In this case, the parameter α passed from αi = 0.56 to αf = 0.26; corre-
spondingly, the doubling time passed from τi = 1.23 to τf = 2.68 and the daily
growth factor from γi = 1.75 to γf = 1.29.
day cases day cases day cases day cases day cases
1 30 2 31 3 51 4 104 5 204
6 346 7 602 8 763 9 977 10 1261
11 1766 12 2337 13 3150 14 3736 15 4212
Table II. COVID-19 cases in the Republic of Korea; day 1 is January 17.
Source: WHO situation reports [2].
1.3 National and regional data in Italy
The statistics of data from Northern Italy is (luckily) more limited, both for
what concerns the number of cases and the length of the time series. On the
other hand this makes that these time series, in view of the relative large incu-
bation period for the COVID-19 infection, did not have the time to react to the
restrictive measures taken by the Italian government and to the modified habits
of the population; thus in building our model we will consider the epidemic
parameters as being constant over the time covered by these data.
The epidemic developed so far mainly in three regions: Lombardia, Veneto
and Emilia-Romagna; from now on these will be denoted as L, V, and ER
respectively (data referring to all of Italy will be denoted as I).
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The total population of Italy is about 60,000,000; that of the mostly involved
regions is roughly as follows: Lombardia 10,000,000; Veneto 5,000,000; Emilia-
Romagna 4,500,000. The two isolated areas (red areas) have a population of
50,000 for the Lombardia one and 3,000 for the Veneto one.
Publicly available data are divided for regions (we have not analyzed so far
special data about the “red areas”) and – limitedly to the overall count for all
of Italy – by the state of the patient; in particular these are subdivided into
the following classes (identified by an acronym in the following): Hospitalized
in Intensive Care units (IC); Hospitalized in standard care units (SC); Isolated
at home (HI); Recovered (REC); Dead (D).
At the date of this study, as far as we know, shortage of IC facilities was not
arising, so we assume that the state of the patient is well reflected by the type
of treatment he/she is undergoing.
The data for all of Italy and for the different regions are reported in figs.3 –6;
these are also fitted by an exponential law, but here the fit is performed on data
from day 3 (February 23) on, as in the first days there seem to be an anomalous
growth, most probably due to recognizing as COVID-19 occurrences of cases
which had been previous considered as standard flu with complications.3
The fit for the whole of Italy, and for the different considered regions, pro-
duces the following parameter α and related quantities:
α τ γ
Italy 0.32 2.14 1.38
Lombardia 0.29 2.36 1.34
Veneto 0.33 2.05 1.40
Emilia-Romagna 0.45 1.56 1.56
Table III. Fit of the parameters α, τ , γ as defind in eqs. (1), (2), (3) for the
whole of Italy and for the different considered regions.
The data available for all of Italy (I) and for these specific areas (denoted
respectively as L, V and E from now on) and concerning all the recognized
infected individuals, independently of the level of the symptoms, are as follows
3This is indeed a delicate point in the statistical analysis, in particular in the early stage of
the epidemic: as the symptoms are very similar, it has to be assumed that a number of COVID
cases were not recognized when it was thought the virus had not yet struck the country –
needless to say, the same could happen in analyzing data from other countries.
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day I L V ER
21 Feb 20 15 2 0
22 Feb 77 54 17 2
23 Feb 146 110 21 9
24 Feb 229 167 32 18
25 Feb 322 240 43 26
26 Feb 400 258 71 47
27 Feb 650 403 111 97
28 Feb 888 531 151 145
29 Feb 1128 615 191 217
01 Mar 1694 984 263 285
02 Mar 1835 1254 273 335
Table IV.a. Known cases of contagion in all of Italy (I) and in different
regions: Lombardia (L), Veneto (V), Emilia-Romagna (ER). Source:
Presidenza del Consiglio - Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, daily press
communications at 18:00 each day [1]. See Figure 3 for a plot of these data.
day IC SC HI Rec Dead Total
24 Feb 27 101 94 1 5 229
25 Feb 35 114 162 1 10 322
26 Feb 36 128 221 3 12 400
27 Feb 56 248 284 45 17 650
28 Feb 64 345 412 46 21 888
29 Feb 105 401 543 50 29 1128
01 Mar 140 639 798 83 34 1694
02 Mar 166 742 927 149 52 1835
Table IV.b. Known cases of contagion in all of Italy (cumulative), according
to treatment. IC: patients in Intensive Care units; SC: patients hospitalized in
standard care units; HI: infected people in home isolation; Rec: recovered.
Source: Presidenza del Consiglio - Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, daily
press communications [1] and Ministero della Salute website [6].
day IC + SC Home Tot Ratio
24 Feb 128 94 222 0.42
25 Feb 149 162 311 0.52
26 Feb 164 221 385 0.57
27 Feb 304 284 588 0.48
28 Feb 409 412 821 0.50
29 Feb 506 543 1049 0.52
01 Mar 779 798 1577 0.51
02 Mar 908 927 1835 0.51
Table IV.c. Known cases of contagion in all of Italy; comparison of the
number of hospitalized patients versus those in home isolation. The Total in
fourth column is that of IC +Hosp + Home; Ratio in the last column is that
of Home/(IC + SC + Home). Elaboration on data from Table IV.b.
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Figure 3: Data for the whole of Italy together with the best exponential fit for
days from February 23 on
day IC SC Tot Ratio
24 Feb 27 101 128 0.21
25 Feb 35 114 149 0.23
26 Feb 36 128 164 0.22
27 Feb 56 248 304 0.18
28 Feb 64 345 409 0.16
29 Feb 105 401 506 0.21
01 Mar 140 639 779 0.18
Table IV.d. COVID-19 patients hospitalized in Italy, in IC and in SC units.
The last column gives the ratio IC/(IC+SC), and shows a ratio fluctuating
around 0.2, in line with findings in China [3]. Elaboration from Table IV.b.
1.4 More detailed local data for most affected depart-
ments
More detailed data, at the Department (Provincia) level, are available only from
February 27 on; these are reported in Table V.a for some of the more severely
affected Department. These are Lodi (LO, total population about 230,000),
Cremona (CR, about 360,000), Piacenza (PC, about 290,000) and Pavia (PV,
about 550,000), and are located (in particular the first three) in a rather ho-
mogeneous geographical area. We also consider data for the Departments of
Bergamo (BG, about 1,110,000) and Brescia (BS, about 1,260,000), which lay
more to the North, of Milano (MI, about 3,200,000), and of Padova (PD, about
940,000); the latter includes the red area in Vo’ Euganeo.
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Figure 4: Data for the region of Lombardia together with the best exponential
fit for days from February 23 on
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Figure 5: Data for the region of Veneto together with the best exponential fit
for days from February 23 on
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Figure 6: Data for the region of Emilia-Romagna together with the best expo-
nential fit for days from February 24 on
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day LO CR PC PV BG BS MI PD
27 Feb 159 91 63 36 72 10 15 59
28 Feb 182 123 89 49 103 13 29 68
29 Feb 237 136 138 55 110 14 30 81
01 Mar 344 214 174 78 209 49 46 105
02 Mar 384 223 212 83 243 60 58 135
Table V.a. Known cases of contagion in specific Departments including or
near the Lombardia red area: Lodi (LO), Cremona (CR), Piacenza (PC) and
Pavia (PV); moreover the Departments of Bergamo (BG), Brescia (BS) and
Milano (MI),also in Lombardia are considered, togeher with that of Padova
(PD) in Veneto, including the Veneto red area.
LO CR PC PV BG BS MI PD
α 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.21 0.31 0.49 0.32 0.21
τ 2.89 2.95 2.24 3.25 2.21 1.41 2.19 3.32
γ 1.27 1.26 1.36 1.24 1.37 1.63 1.37 1.23
Table V.b. Best fit of the α factor with the corresponding doubling time τ
and daily growth factor γ – see eqs. (1), (2) and (3) – for the different
Departments considered in Table V.a. See Figure 7 for the fit.
We note that while Lodi, Cremona and Pavia (which is however more distant
from the red area) grow at about the same rate, the growth rate in the depart-
ment of Piacenza – which is contiguous to the Lombardia red area – appears to
be specially high. The same applies to the Bergamo and Brescia. It is possible
that some area in these Departments should better be isolated in the same way
as the red area in Lodi Department, and indeed such measures are presently
under consideration. The impact of the red area in Vo’ Euganeo on the Padova
Department appears to be rather limited, as also implied by its small size. The
growth rate in the Milano area is higher than other ones; this had to be expected
considering that it is related to the population size and density, but for exactly
the same reasons it appears worrying.
9
1 2 3 4 5
4.8
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
6
1 2 3 4 5
4.4
4.6
4.8
5.2
5.4
LO CR
1 2 3 4 5
4.25
4.5
4.75
5
5.25
1 2 3 4 5
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.2
4.4
PC PV
1 2 3 4 5
4.25
4.5
4.75
5
5.25
5.5
1 2 3 4 5
2.5
3
3.5
4
BG BS
1 2 3 4 5
2.5
2.75
3.25
3.5
3.75
4
1 2 3 4 5
3.8
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
MI PD
Figure 7: Semi-logarithmic plot of data for certain Departments (see text) to-
gether with best fit (see Table V.b for value of the parameters).
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2 Discussion
So far we have only provided raw data; in this short Section we will present some
considerations based on simple models and on projections of he progression of
the epidemic with a reduced speed.4
2.1 Inference from growth rates
The figures given above for the growth rates and daily growth factors in different
areas would allow for an easy estimate of the situation in the next few days
should growth go on at the same rate. However, some restrictive measure and
a campaign of public awareness were started about ten days ago, so – in view
of the COVID-19 incubation time – these should start having some effect any
moment. Comparison with the Korean experience suggest this could lead as far
as halving the growth rate, i.e. doubling the replication time.
In the following Table VI we give the forecast of known infections within one
week (i.e. at March 10) for different areas under different hypotheses for the
reduction of the growth rate5, i.e. assuming we get a reduced growth rate
α˜ = r α0 , (4)
with α the present one. In this Table we have considered reductions as drastic
as r = 0.3,but the Korean experience suggests it is difficult to go beyond r =
0.6− 0.5.
r 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
I 17200 13800 11000 8800 7000 5600 4500 3600
L 9500 7800 6400 5200 4200 3500 2800 2300
V 2800 2200 1700 1400 1100 900 700 500
ER 7800 5700 4200 3000 2200 1600 1200 900
Table VI. Projection of infection cases at March 10 under the hypotheses the
restrictive measures reduce the growth rate by a factor r, see (4).
2.2 Suggestions from simple models
Albeit we have not discussed models for the COVID epidemics, and we intend
to present a dedicated model in a companion paper, it may be worth making
some general considerations on the relevance of lowering the parameter α based
on epidemiological models, and in particular on the simple SIR model [7].
4The computations in this Section are extremely rough, and will be superseeded by the
more adapted model to be discussed in a companion paper; moreover they will appear rather
trivial to reader expert in the field. We will nevertheless present them, as we hope this
document can reach also readers not familiar with epidemic models.
5As well known, exponential growth can not goon forever; however the numbers are still
(luckily) rather small compared to the overall populations, so this regime should be well
described by an exponential behavior.
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The SIR model is described by the equations
dS/dt = − aS I
dI/dt = aS I − b I
dR/dt = b I .
Here S represents Susceptible individuals, I the infected ones, and R those
removed from the epidemic dynamics. Note that the total population N =
S + I +R is assumed to remain constant.
It is immediately apparent that in the SIR model the number of infected
will grow as long as
S > Γ := b/a ;
thus Γ is also known as the epidemic threshold. The epidemic can develop only
if the population is above the epidemic threshold.
The parameters a and b describe the contact rate and the removal rate; they
depend both on the characteristics of the pathogen and on social behavior. For
example, a prompt isolation of infected individuals is reflected in raising b, a
reduction of social contacts is reflected in lowering α, and both these actions
raise the epidemic threshold Γ. If this is raised above the level of the total
population N , the epidemic stops (which means the number of infected individ-
uals starts to decrease, albeit new individuals will still be infected). The same
effect can be obtained by reducing the population N , i.e. by partitioning it into
non-communicating compartments, each of them with a population below the
epidemic threshold.6
One can easily obtain the relation between I and S by writing
dI/dS = − 1 +
Γ
S
,
which upon elementary integration yields
I = I0 + (S0 − S) + Γ log(S/S0) ;
with I0, S0 the initial data for I(t) and S(t); in ordinary circumstances, i.e.
unless there are naturally immune individuals, S0 = N − I0 ≃ N .
As we know that the maximum I∗ of I will be reached when S = Γ, we
obtain from this an estimate of this maximum (note that we do not have an
analytical estimate of the time needed to reach this maximum); writing Γ = σN
(with σ < 1) this reads
I∗ = (1− σ)N − σN log(1/σ) = [1 − σ − σ log(1/σ)] N . (5)
Thus increasing Γ, even if we do not manage to take it above the population
N , leads to a reduction of the epidemic peak; this reduction can be rather
6Albeit strictly speaking these predictions only hold within the SIR model, and surely the
exact value of the threshold refers to this model only, the mechanism at play is rather general,
and similar behaviors are met in all kind of epidemic models.
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Figure 8: Numerical simulation of I(t) as provided by a simple SIR model (in
arbitrary units) for different values of the contact rate a; solid: a = a0, dashed:
a = a0 ∗ 0.8, dotted: a = a0 ∗ 0.7. It is clear how a reduction in the contact rate
produces a substantially more manageable epidemic dynamics, both in terms of
lowering of the epidemic peak and due to a slower dynamics.
relevant also for a relatively moderate reduction of α and thus increase of Γ.
See the example condensed in Table VII.
We stress that a reduction of the parameter a does not only lead to a lowering
of the epidemic peak, but also slows down the whole epidemic dynamics. This
is shown in Figure 8.
r Γ I∗
1.0 1.21 · 107 1.81 · 106
0.9 1.35 · 107 1.21 · 106
0.8 1.52 · 107 6.42 · 105
0.7 1.73 · 107 1.89 · 105
0.6 2.02 · 107 1.02 · 103
Table VII. Exemplification of the effect of reduction of the contact rate a on
the epidemic peak. Here N = 20, 000, 000, b = 1/5 and a0 = (5/3)10
−8,
a = ra0. The values of Γ = b/a and I∗(Γ) are tabulated for different values of
r ≤ 1 such that the population is still above the epidemic threshold, Γ < N .
We stress that the SIR model is too simple to try to extract from it any
prediction on the progression of the COVID-19 epidemics; a fortiori if with a
naive estimation of the parameters.
However, it points out at the absolute need to reduce the parameter the
contact rate a – which implies reducing the parameter α describing the growth
of the infection – in order to reduce the epidemic peak and to slow down the
epidemic dynamics, getting more time to get prepared to face the epidemic peak.
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3 Conclusions
The spread of COVID-19 epidemics in Northern Italy is well described by an
exponential growth with parameter α ≃ 0.32, with higher values in some regions.
This should be compared with the growth rates in China, and in this sense the
observed figure is quite worrying because:
1. The absolute value of the growth rate is rather large, and very much
similar to the growth rate in the early stage of the epidemics in China
(α = 0.33).
2. The substantial reduction of the growth rate in China was due to rather
strict measures by the central and local Governments. Restrictive mea-
sures have also been taken in Italy, but these are substantially weaker than
those adopted in China. As these were implemented around February 24,
their effects will be readable (in view of the rather large incubation time
of COVID) only in the next few days.
3. The experience of Korea – which is in some ways more comparable to
Italy in terms of total population and political decision system – can give
some hint on the expected outcome of not so drastic restrictive measures;
in that case, the α parameter has been nearly halved, and corresponding
the doubling time has doubled itself. This leads – both in Korea and
assuming the same effect is obtained by the Italian restrictive measures
and public awareness – to a slowing down in the epidemic growth, but not
to recovering control over the situation, i.e. taking the dynamics below
the epidemic threshold [7].
4. We expect the growth rate of an epidemic in a given region to be propor-
tional to, and anyway correlated to, its overall population and population
density.In this respect, one should recall that the population of Hubei is
around 60,000,000; on the other hand, the total population of the Italian
regions mainly involved (Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna) is about
20,000,000. This means that the virus is circulating at a very high rate,
and social contacts should be substantially reduced in order to have any
hope to stop, or at least substantially slowing down, its spreading.
5. The standard theory of SIR epidemics (not completely adapted to the
present situation) shows that a reduction in the contact rate can lead to a
substantially more manageable development of the epidemics, in particular
postponing the peak period and making it less severe in terms of the
number of cases to be treated simultaneously. One should not forget,
indeed, that albeit COVID is lethal only in a relatively small number of
cases, of the order of 1% (to be however compared with the 10−4 of flu),
this refers to the situation where patients can be properly assisted; as well
known, a saturation of Hospital facilities, or even just of Intensive Care
units, would lead to a dramatic increase of the mortality rate.
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